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Abstract
Overview
Eight years of octopus fishery records from southwest Madagascar reveal significant posi-
tive impacts from 36 periodic closures on: (a) fishery catches and (b) village fishery income,
such that (c) economic benefits from increased landings outweigh costs of foregone catch.
Closures covered ~20% of a village’s fished area and lasted 2-7 months.
Fishery Catches from Each Closed Site
Octopus landings and catch per unit effort (CPUE) significantly increased in the 30 days fol-
lowing a closure’s reopening, relative to the 30 days before a closure (landings: +718%,
p<0.0001; CPUE: +87%, p<0.0001; n = 36). Open-access control sites showed no before/
after change when they occurred independently of other management (“no ban”, n = 17/36).
On the other hand, open-access control sites showed modest catch increases when they
extended a 6-week seasonal fishery shutdown (“ban”, n = 19/36). The seasonal fishery
shutdown affects the entire region, so confound all potential control sites.
Fishery Income in Implementing Villages
In villages implementing a closure, octopus fishery income doubled in the 30 days after a
closure, relative to 30 days before (+132%, p<0.001, n = 28). Control villages not imple-
menting a closure showed no increase in income after “no ban” closures and modest in-
creases after “ban” closures. Villages did not show a significant decline in income during
closure events.
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Net Economic Benefits from Each Closed Site
Landings in closure sites generated more revenue than simulated landings assuming con-
tinued open-access fishing at that site (27/36 show positive net earnings; mean +$305/clo-
sure; mean +57.7%monthly). Benefits accrued faster than local fishers’ time preferences
during 17-27 of the 36 closures. High reported rates of illegal fishing during closures corre-
lated with poor economic performance.
Broader Co-Management
We discuss the implications of our findings for broader co-management arrangements, par-
ticularly for catalyzing more comprehensive management.
Introduction
As over-exploitation and global change threaten reefs worldwide, sustainably managing coral
reefs is crucial to protecting both reef biodiversity and the food security of hundreds of millions
of coastal people [1–4]. Because two-thirds of all reefs lie in developing countries [5], the goal
of conserving reefs globally requires management strategies that can effectively balance both
conservation and development goals. This developing world setting frequently includes high
population growth rates, low incomes, and weak national-scale governance [6–8]. In this con-
text, local communities’ support for management actions is crucial to effectively protect biodi-
versity and human livelihoods [9–13].
There is a growing body of research reporting on coastal management efforts designed, en-
forced, and maintained by communities or communities with an external partner (co-manage-
ment) [9,14–16]. Employing a broad array of measures, community and co-management
arrangements around the world have produced positive outcomes for both conservation and
development goals [9,13,16]. When effective, such arrangements can help communities better
manage their resources over the long term, helping them break from the tragedy of the com-
mons, where open access leads to overexploitation, and from resource-dependent poverty
traps, where natural resource depletion and dependence reinforce each other [17–19]. Howev-
er, while community and co-management models are becoming more common, quantitative
impact assessments remain uncommon and many management failures are under-reported.
These research gaps hinder robust generalizations about the effectiveness of community and
co-management approaches [9,11].
The periodic fishery closure, in which fishers temporarily refrain from harvesting in specific
areas [20,21] is an increasingly popular community-based tool with a growing base of empirical
support [22–24]. Periodic closures have long been a part of traditional fishing cultures across
the Indo-Pacific [20,25–27], and still play an active role in community management of marine
resources in the region [22–24,28]. Periodic harvest, or pulse fishing, also has been a commonly
discussed strategy in the western fisheries literature [29], and has been suggested as a viable al-
ternative to constant, or stationary, fishing yields since at least the 1970s [30,31].
Many periodic harvest regimes have been designed with a single-species in mind [32]. Prac-
tical examples from both models and field data generally target sedentary marine invertebrates,
and highlight that urchins [33], sea scallops [34,35], and abalone [36] make good candidates
for a periodic regime. Periodic closure regimes in the tropical Indo-Pacific have shown positive
effects on abundance in giant clams (Tridacna spp.) [22] and varied results for trochus (aka
topshell, Tectus niloticus) [22–24,37,38].
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Periodic harvest strategies in artisanal contexts frequently apply not to single target species
but instead to multi-species assemblages, including relatively long-lived reef fishes [22–
24,28,39,40]. The few studies that have shown positive effects of periodic closures on mixed
reef fish fisheries noted increases in fish biomass in periodically closed areas relative to open ac-
cess sites [22,23]. All three focal areas in these studies, however, were characterized by small
human populations exerting low fishing pressure on resources to which they have exclusive
tenure [22,23]; the results do not hold in areas subject to higher fishing pressures [28,39–41],
perhaps because closure periods were too short, open periods too long, or fishing intensity dur-
ing open periods was too intense to support robust recovery from fishing mortality [28,39–41].
Another reason may be that in areas with higher pressure and competition, fisher populations
prefer immediate reward from landing a smaller catch today over a larger and more uncertain
future catch [42].
While results from the field have been variable, models of fisheries economics suggest that
in certain cases a periodic harvest can provide a better economic yield than stationary harvest
[30,31], specifically when the fishery has low selectivity [31,43]. A fishery’s optimal opening/
closing cycle (i.e., the pulse-length) is a function of both the target species’ biology (i.e., specifi-
cally the target species’ growth rate and life-span) and the fishery’s economics (i.e., landing
prices and the local fisher’s discount rate, their time preference for immediate versus delayed
reward) [43]. The time between openings varies dramatically depending on the target species’
biology [32], and higher discount rates lead to either shortening the optimal closure durations
or shifting the economic optimum to stationary, rather than periodic harvest [31,44].
Models and experience suggest that the success or failure of a periodic closure regime de-
pends on the governance system’s ability to match fishing patterns to a fishery’s “optimal” peri-
odic harvest schedule [23,24,29]. Factors shown to improve the odds of matching actual and
optimal harvest in the context of periodic closures include: exclusive tenure to the resource in
question, respected and legitimate leadership, high social capital, low fishing pressure, low effi-
ciency gears, and robust ecological knowledge [22–24,45]. Not surprisingly, these governance
factors mirror those that more generally correlate with successful community/co-management
[13,16,46].
Experience with successful, targeted management might also serve as a catalyst for broader
community management [24,45,47]. In Vanuatu, government-sponsored management efforts
employing a range of interventions, including periodic closures, led to community engagement
with managers and co-management of many other species of fish and invertebrates [47]. In In-
donesia, villages with active or lapsed periodic closure traditions showed broader, more active
marine management than villages with no such tradition [45]. Commons theory suggests that
communities are more likely to engage in management when expected benefits outweigh the
perceived costs of management [17]. In these cases, successful demonstrations of desirable ben-
efit:cost ratios likely informed expectations, while offering an opportunity to build governance
capacity and social capital needed to broaden management efforts [17].
Here we present an analysis of the fishery and economic effects of periodic octopus fishery
closures in the Velondriake Locally Managed Marine Area (LMMA) in southwest Madagascar
(Fig 1). This work serves to fill research gaps by providing empirical impact assessments of co-
management outcomes for a specific periodic fishery closure regime. Establishing the baseline
efficacy of these interventions is particularly timely, as the use of periodic closures as a fisheries
management tool is proliferating across the western Indian Ocean [48].
To do so, first, we quantify effects on site-specific landings and catch per unit effort (CPUE)
from multiple periodic closure events compared to paired controls. Second, we examine octo-
pus fishery-generated income accrued at the village level. Third, we assess whether individual
closed sites generate net economic benefits, and compare the rates at which these benefits are
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generated to local fishers’ time preferences (Fig 2). Finally, as broader co-management efforts
in the LMMA followed the widespread adoption of the octopus closure regime, we discuss a
fertile area for future research testing the hypothesis that effective periodic closures can serve
as a catalyst for broader community management.
Methods
2.1. Marine Resource Management in the Velondriake LMMA
Starting in 2003, the non-governmental organization Blue Ventures, with local and interna-
tional partners (Institut Halieutique et des Sciènces Marines, Wildlife Conservation Society,
COPEFRITO) began a series of meetings with the community of Andavadoaka in southwest
Madagascar to discuss approaches to managing local marine resources. In initial conversations,
the community demurred from engaging in permanent no-take areas, but was willing to at-
tempt a 7-month closure of octopus fishing on a shallow offshore reef beginning November 1,
2004 [49].
After a favorable initial reception, this closure regime spread. Locally, the 25 villages that
now compose the ~1,000 km2 Velondriake LMMA oversaw 69 different octopus closures be-
tween 2004 and 2011 [48,50]. An African Development Bank project supported 50 additional
closures around southwest Madagascar between 2009 and 2013 [49]. Further, beginning in
2005 the national government formalized the community initiative by shutting down the entire
southwest region octopus fishery for six weeks between mid-December and late January [49].
The model also spread internationally, with the neighboring island state of Mauritius enacting
similar legislation in 2012 [51]. Following the spread of the octopus closure regime, the Velon-
driake regional management committee took broader management steps within the LMMA,
instituting periodic mangrove closures targeted at a local crab fishery, banning destructive fish-
ing practices, engaging in ecological monitoring, and, five years after refusing the idea, institut-
ing the first of now six permanent, community-enforced no-take areas [48,49].
The octopus fishery in Velondriake targets a group of four shallow-water species: Octopus
cyanea (95% of local catches), Callistoctopus macropus (~4%), Amphioctopus aegina (~1%),
Callistoctopus ornatus (rare) (D. Raberinary pers. comm, [52]). These four octopus species
Fig 1. Maps of Study Area. (A) Large-scale map of Madagascar and the African continent, (B) Inset of the
25 villages of the Velondriake Locally ManagedMarine Area in southwestern Madagascar. Vertical
box extent is ~75 km. (C) Representative example of a periodic octopus fishery closure. Indicated in the map
are two villages, Andavadoaka and Ampasilava, with their respective octopus fishing sites mapped in orange
and yellow. In green, you can see the sites Amagnahitse and Nosinkara, in which these two villages have
repeatedly co-implemented a periodic octopus fishery closure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.g001
Catch & Economic Benefits of Periodic Octopus Fishery Closures
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075 June 17, 2015 4 / 24
each have a lifecycle of about one year, dispersing as paralarvae for 2–3 months, then growing
over 6–9 months from<1 g at settlement to commonly above 3 kg [53–55]. They appear to be
year-round spawners, although recent studies suggest that recruitment fluctuates throughout
the year [52].
The bulk of octopus is caught during spring low tides by gleaners, predominately women.
They generally sell any octopus over the nationally regulated minimum size of 350g to outside
buyers [56,57]. Though only 180 km north of Toliara, this region lacks transport infrastructure,
rendering the isolated villages dependent on private exporting companies for market access.
Upon instituting an octopus closure, villagers typically close about one fifth of their village’s
octopus harvest area (~124 ha +/- 45 CI95), for a period between 2–7 months, sometimes re-
peatedly (Fig 1C; Key Informant Interviews, Shawn Peabody, co-manager). The Velondriake
Committee, an elected management body, selects closure sites, chooses closure durations, and
coordinates management. Communities self-enforce the closures, sanctions are prescribed by
local law (dina), and enforced by consensus at community meetings [58]. Blue Ventures Con-
servation, the co-managing non-governmental organization, provides technical and funding
support for management efforts in cooperation with the partners mentioned above [49].
Fig 2. Experimental design and samples sizes used to investigate effects of periodic fishery closures. (A) Site fishery catches, (B) Village fishery
income, and (C) Site net economic benefts. Colors highlight the distinctions among “no-ban” and “ban” closures, and between closure sites/villages and
either open-access controls (A&B) or simulated landings (C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.g002
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2.2. Socioeconomic background and surveys
Most of the approximately 7,500 people living in Velondriake (S1 and S2 Tables, S1 File) are
Vezo, a subgroup of the Sakalava ethnic group whose cultural identity is tied to a fishing and
gleaning lifestyle [59]. Consistent with their living in a very poor nation, Vezo populations are
frequently characterized by low incomes, high resource dependence, and rapid population
growth (~3% annually) [60].
To expand the local information available, a socio-economic household survey was con-
ducted between August and September 2010 across 16 villages and 301 households (also see
[61]). The 35-question household survey collected data on household demographics, income
sources, fishing practices, wealth, and resource extraction habits. The survey design was based
on regional socio-economic monitoring guidelines [62] and validity recommendations [63]. To
ensure validity, a trained, local Vezo survey team undertook the survey in Vezo; a bi-lingual
field manager supervised the teams. Pilot surveys in three villages helped inform the final sur-
vey. All survey data were double entered in Excel and quality controlled.
Villages were stratified according to geographic region (north, central, south) to account for
proximity to market, and surrounding habitat (island, coast, mangrove, inland) to account for
differences in fishing habits. Inland villages were eliminated from the study due to their greater
dependence on farming rather than fishing and no south-island villages exist. The eight re-
maining strata (north-island, north-coastal, north-mangrove, central-island, central-coast,
central-mangrove, south-coast, south-mangrove) allow for extrapolation to non-sampled vil-
lages. When possible, forty random households were sampled in each stratum, and female and
male heads of household were alternately interviewed (S1 Table). Upon entering a village, each
member of the survey team picked a random number between 1 and 12 representing the direc-
tion he or she had to walk (e.g., 3 meant 3 o’clock). Walking up to each household along that
trajectory, surveyors consulted a list of previously generated random numbers between 1 and
100; if the number was below “X” then the household was sampled. “X” was different for each
village, and is the (# of sampled households desired) / (the total # of households in that village).
Focus groups with fishers and gleaners in the main village of Andavadoaka provided data
on market prices paid for catch, quantity and cost of gear used, and seasons (total of 12 focus
groups). Interviews with fishers, commercial buyers, local middlemen (“sous collectors”), fish
mongers, managers, and villagers across Velondriake (total of 26 interviews) provided informa-
tion on: market prices, patterns of community decision making, local engagement with man-
agement, etc. Focus group participants and key informants were opportunistically sampled,
and snowball sampling identified additional participants/informants. Market surveys and di-
rect observations corroborated information such as market prices of fish and gear.
2.3. Landings Data, Sale Price, Participatory Mapping
Since 2004, trained data collectors recorded octopus landings across Velondriake at the point
of sale. Each day, collectors waited at the point of sale in each participating village, which al-
lowed easy collection of a large proportion (if not complete coverage) of the day’s catch. Collec-
tors recorded each fishing trip including the number of fishers in the group, number of
octopus caught, weight of each individual octopus, fishing site, date, village name, gear type,
fisher names, fisher ages, and fisher genders. Data collected after 2008 includes octopus sex as
well. The dataset’s 258,108 individual weighed octopuses from 67,990 trips were double-en-
tered, cross-checked, and quality controlled in 2010–2011.
The price per kilogram octopus was assessed through direct observations at points of sale in
June-August 2009, and trends in the “beach price” over time were confirmed through focus
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groups and key informant interviews (S2 Table). Prices were adjusted for inflation and pur-
chasing power [8].
In 2009–10, we conducted participatory mapping exercises with fishers in all Velondriake’s
villages to define boundaries of each fishing site. This exercise improved the managers’ and re-
searchers’ ability to translate between local site names and specific fishing areas. A focus group
of each village’s octopus fishers was asked to delineate their village’s named sites on large, lami-
nated posters showing the satellite imagery (Google Earth) of the village’s coast. These maps
were then digitized and transferred into GIS shapefiles. Each site was given a unique identifier,
cross-referenced to the local site names, and confirmed with villagers [64].
2.4. Illegal Catch Rate
As a measure of compliance with closures, we assessed the severity of reported illegal fishing in
the closed sites as “low,” “moderate,” or “high.” To assign these categories, we assessed levels of
illegal fishing reported in the landings data during a closure relative to baseline catches, defined
as total landings from the closure site in the 30 days before a closure. Here, “low” indicates that
octopus catches recorded during the closure equaled 0–5% of baseline “before” catches; “mod-
erate”, 5–50% of baseline; and “high” at least 50%. Fishers readily reported this activity, but
nevertheless we consider these reports as a minimum estimate of illegal activity.
2.5. Fishery effects analysis: Landings, effort & catch per unit effort
We used a Before, After, Control, Impact (BACI) statistical design and mixed model ANOVA
to test the effects of octopus closures in the Velondriake LMMA on (a) octopus fishery landings
(kg octopus/30 days), (b) octopus fisher effort (total fisher-days/30 days), and (c) catch per
unit effort (kg octopus/fisher-day). A subset of 36 closure events had adequate baseline data,
defined as at least 5 fishers and 10 octopuses recorded in each of the 30-day periods before and
after the closure (Fig 2A).
Seventeen (17) of these 36 closures occurred independently of other management measures,
while the other 19 extended the six-week governmentally-imposed regional octopus fishery
shutdown that was in effect in austral summer each year beginning in 2005. We refer through-
out the paper to the 17 independently occurring closures as “no-ban” closures, and the 19 clo-
sures that extended the shutdown as “ban” closures (Fig 2).
Control Site Selection. Wematched each of the 36 focal closure sites with a similar con-
trol site that (a) never had a local closure, (b) showed trends in baseline data similar to those of
the closed site (i.e., the site’s monthly octopus landings; see baseline landings correlation (r)
below), and (c) had adequate data available during the focal periods (see relative data availabil-
ity index below). We took five steps to establish a set of impact-control pairings. (1) We pre-
pared a baseline dataset free of ‘closure effects’ by removing data from each known closure site
for the period from closure to 60 days after reopening. (2) Generate baseline landings correla-
tion: To highlight site pairs that presented correlated baseline trends, we aggregated the total
baseline landings of octopus by month for each fishing site, and then compared the full records
of the 36 focal closed sites to 318 potential control sites using Pearson’s correlation of monthly
catch totals (i.e., r). (3) Generate relative data availability index: To assess relative availability
of data at potential control sites, we counted the minimum number of fisher-days available in
either the 30 days before or after the closure, divided by the value from the control-closure
pairing with the highest recorded fisher-days. Minimum available fisher-days during focal peri-
ods in selected control sites ranged from 6 to 120, with a mean of 27.6 fisher-days. (4) We then
ranked each of the 11,448 potential control site-closure site pairings based on a suitability score
that was composed of the average of the pair’s baseline landings correlation and relative data
Catch & Economic Benefits of Periodic Octopus Fishery Closures
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availability index during focal periods. (5) Finally, given the suitability score rankings, we ran a
“draft-pick” algorithm, allowing each closure to select (and exclude) its top-ranked control;
then randomized the selection order of the “draft-pick” set of 36 control-closure pairs over
10,000 times, taking the best global control-closure solution.
Normality and homoscedasticity of response variables were assayed using q-q plots and
Levene’s test. Upon failure of either condition we log-transformed the variable in question,
which met these assumptions in each case. Each analysis was performed using the lme4 pack-
age in R [65], using Period (i.e., Before or After closure), Control/Impact, and co-occurrence of
the regional fishery shutdown (“ban”/”no ban”) as fixed effects, and, because multiple closure
events could happen with the same closure site (at different times), we included Closure Site as
a random effect. All reported significance probabilities derive from independent contrasts
within this mixed-model framework [65–66].
2.6. Village Income
For all villages that implemented a closure event, we used a mixed model design similar to that
described above to test for differences in three variables: (a) total village octopus income (all oc-
topus landed in a village (kg)  beach price ($/kg); $), (b) total fishing effort (fisher-days), and
(c) income per unit effort (2011 $ PPP/fisher-day) across three periods: (i) 30 days pre-closure
(before); (ii) closure period (during; normalized to 30-day measure); (iii) 30 days post-reopen-
ing (after). We analyzed income and effort from villages implementing 28 closure events,
which represent the subset of the 36 closures analyzed above for which we had data coverage to
pair villages implementing a closure with control villages that had no closure at the same time.
Of these 28, 14 were “no-ban” closures, and 14 were “ban” closures (Fig 2B).
2.7. Stochastic modeling of site-specific closure net economic benefits
To assess the site-specific net economic benefits of each closure site, we compared landings
from closure sites to stochastically modeled landings assuming continued open-access fishing
at the same site. To do so, we modeled both the foregone earnings for periods during and 60
days after 36 closures and then compared these modeled earnings to the actual catch data from
36 closure events (Fig 2C).
Our data provide us with two observed distributions required for our simulations: (1) V, the
number of fishers visiting the focal site on a given day, and (2) C, the beach value of octopus
caught by one fisher on one day. Each of these distributions are drawn directly from the fishery
data, and stochastically sampled to generate our simulated data comparison (S7 Fig). To build
the visitation distribution, V, we first recorded the number of fishers that went to the focal site
each day it was visited during the entire study period excluding closure periods and six-weeks
after a closure reopened. On days that a site received no recorded landings, there are three pos-
sibilities: (1) there was no fishing activity, (2) there was activity but no one visited the site, or
(3) at least one fisher visited the site, but they caught no octopus. To accurately estimate case 2
(actual zero-visit days) we first excluded case 1 (no fishing days) by only counting zero days on
which (a) there was fishing recorded in a village that had ever fished the focal site, and (b) no
landings were recorded from the site in question. To further correct the estimated zero-visit
days for case (3) we fit the parameter Z, where a site’smodeled # of zero-visit days = (Z  zero
days with active fishing). We ran 100 iterations of our landings simulation model on data from
36 open-access control sites for each potential estimate of Z (from 0 to 2, by 0.025) and then
calculated the difference between our modeled fishery landings and the actual landings in
those 36 sites. By finding the minimummedian divergence between actual and modeled values,
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we determined that the minimal model bias was generated with a value of Z = 0.525. All simu-
lations thereafter used that parameter value.
This zero-bin multiplier tuning made our net economic benefit criterion more severe. That
is, by roughly halving the probability of “no visit”, this provided a higher estimate of counter-
factual catches (or “cost”), and therefore made our “profitability” criterion more conservative.
The value per unit effort distribution, C, derives from CPUE at 150 control sites during the pe-
riod in question (during or after), using beach prices on the day and village of sale.
To simulate the “no closure” catch value, for each day in which fishing is reported in a rele-
vant village (i.e., one that has fished in the focal site in the past), we sampled from the focal
site’s V, returning a number of fishers that visited that site that day: Vd. Then we sampled Vd
times from C to generate a distribution of single fisher’s daily catch values (Cf). The daily sum
of Cf over all fishers on a given day generated a time-series of total daily catch values, Ld. The
sum of daily value each day (Ld) over all days sampled (NFD), generated a total landings L.
Ld¼
XVd
f¼1Cf
L¼
XNFD
d¼1Ld¼
XNFD
d¼1
XVd
f¼1Cf
By treating L, the simulated catch value (i.e., what people would have earned had they not
instituted a closure) as the cost, and A, the total actual recorded landings value from the closure
site over the same time period as the beneﬁts, we estimated the net earnings (NE) of the closure
relative to its counter-factual control (NE = A-L). For each of the 36 modeled closures, we ran
our stochastic model 1000 times resulting in a distribution of net earnings values for each
closure.
2.8. Internal rate of return
The internal rate of return of a particular closure is the discount rate at which the net present
value of the net earnings is equal to zero:
NPVNE ¼ 0 ¼
XT
t¼0NEt
1
ð1þ @Þt
where NPVNE is the net present value of the net earnings, t is the days since closure, NEt is the
daily net earnings, and @ is the discount rate. We also calculated each closure’s percentage re-
turn on investment (ROI) by dividing the net beneﬁts by the costs.
2.9. Seasonality of settlement and CPUE
We assessed seasonal patterns of settlement and catch per unit effort from 2004–2011 (S9 Fig).
First, to assess patterns unaffected by closure effects, we removed all closure sites from the fish-
ery dataset. Then using an octopus’ mass at capture and a growth curve for O. cyanea [67] we
back-calculated an estimate of that octopus’ settlement date. From this collection of dates, we
report the relative frequency of estimated settlement events occurring on a given Julian day
(S9 Fig). Then we assess the CPUE across the entire dataset on each day from 2004–2011, and
present a LOESS fit of these data (with 95% confidence intervals). We then calculate the lagged
cross-correlation between settlement frequency and subsequent seasonal CPUE shift.
Catch & Economic Benefits of Periodic Octopus Fishery Closures
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Results
3.1. Socioeconomics
The Vezo within the Velondriake LMMA have a mean income of $1.72 per person per day,
below the $2 per day poverty standard, and they rely heavily on seafood protein for their food
security (all $ figures presented are in 2011 international dollars, which adjusts for purchasing
power parity (PPP); S1 File, S3 and S4 Tables). Gleaning contributed at least half of household
income for 62% of households [S1 File], though individual fishers earn more from sea cucum-
bers and finfish [61].
3.2. Fishery landings and CPUE–BACI Analysis
The 36 closure sites for which we had adequate baseline data showed significant increases after
re-opening in both octopus landings and CPUE of octopus, regardless of their timing with the
annual regional octopus fishery shutdown (Figs 3, S1 and S2). Across the 36 closures, median
octopus landings increased from 49.5 (±22.8 CI95) kg in the 30 days before closure to 404.8
(±119.9) kg in the 30 days after reopening, a 717.8% increase (p<0.0001, S2 Fig). This signifi-
cant increase is robust to the timing of the regional shutdown, appearing both in the 17 “no
ban” closures, that occurred independently of the regional shutdown (+550%, p<0.0001), and
the 19 “ban” closures, that extended the shutdown (+821%, p<0.0001; Figs 2 and S1).
Control sites had median landings of 44.5 (±35.5) kg in the 30 days before, and 74.6 (±46.6)
kg after re-opening (+67%; S2 Fig). Though this increase in control sites is statistically signifi-
cant (p<0.01), it is ten-fold smaller than in closed sites (S2 and S3 Figs). Moreover, the effect in
controls is driven by the 19 “ban” closures that extended the shutdown (+97%, p<0.05) and ab-
sent in the controls for the 17 “no ban” closures (+67.7%, p = 0.36; S1 Fig).
A closure’s reopening attracted many fishers. Again comparing 30-day periods immediately
before each closure and after re-opening, the 36 closed sites had a median 477.8% increase in
effort (fisher-days; p<0.0001, S1 and S2 Figs). There is also a weakly significant effort effect in
the controls (median +74%, p = 0.05; S2 Fig), however, once split by timing relative to the re-
gional shutdown, neither controls for the 17 “no ban” closures nor those for the 19 “ban” clo-
sures showed significant effort increases (median +88%, p = 0.37; +117%, p = 0.28; Figs 2, 3
and S1).
Catch per unit effort (kg/fisher-day, CPUE) showed large and significant increases at clo-
sure sites while control sites showed only a minor boost, which was again restricted to those
“ban” closures co-occurring with the regional shutdown (Figs 2 and S2). In closure sites fishers
caught a median of 2.37 (±0.33) kg of octopus per fisher-day before closure, but after the clo-
sure re-opened, fishers caught 4.42 (±0.51) kg/fisher-day, a CPUE increase of 86.6%
(p<<0.0001; S2 Fig). These significant CPUE increases were present both in “ban” and “no
ban” closures (Figs 2 and 3). In control sites for the 17 “no ban” closures, median CPUE
showed no significant change (p = 0.93; Fig 3), while controls for the 19 “ban” closures showed
a moderate boost (+49%, p<0.01; Fig 3).
Both the landings and CPUE boosts were greatest immediately after the closure’s reopening,
and diminished within days to weeks after the opening (S3 and S4 Figs). Landings tended to re-
turn to baseline levels after the first or second tidal series, generally within about 7–10 days
after reopening (S3 Fig). CPUE effects were also strongest in the first set of spring low tides
after the opening, but continued into the second or third set of spring low tides (i.e., 14–25
days; S4 Fig). As this fishery is depth limited, most active fishing occurs during the lowest tides
(i.e. spring) tides.
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3.2. Village-level fishery income
After closures reopened, villages that implemented closures experienced higher incomes from
octopus fisheries compared to villages within the LMMA that did not implement closures
(Fig 4, Table 1). In the 28 examined closure events, the implementing villages had mean octo-
pus-fishery income of $597 (±$168) for the 30 days before the closure, and $1,407 (±$322) in
the 30 days after the closure reopened, an increase of 136% (p< 1e-5; Figs 2 and 4, S5 Fig).
While villages saw significant positive net benefits from closures, their apparent costs due to
foregone catch were not statistically distinguishable. On average, neither implementing nor
control villages experienced a consistent, significant decline in octopus income during the clo-
sure periods relative to the 30 days before (p = NS; Figs 4, S5 and S6). For villages with closed
sites, both the significant income increase after reopening and the lack of income decline dur-
ing the closure were robust to co-occurrence with the regional shutdown (i.e., “ban”/“no ban”;
Figs 2, 4 and S6). Conversely, income effects in control villages (with no closed sites) depended
on the timing of the regional octopus fishery shutdown. For “no ban” closures, control villages
had no significant change in village-level octopus fishery income before, during, or after the
Fig 3. Closure effects on Catch-Per-Unit-Effort. Site-level catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE, kg/fisher-day), 30 days before closure and after reopening at
closed sites and paired control sites. Data are separated by season, thus separating those closures that occurred independently of a regional fishery
shutdown (“no ban”), and those that extended the shutdown (“ban”). Significance indicators show distinctions between a particular group and its “before”
group comparison, independent contrasts from linear mixed models. NS = Not Significant; * = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.001. For components of CPUE and data
aggregated across seasons, please see S1 & S2 Figs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.g003
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Fig 4. Closure effects on Village Fishery Income. Total village-level octopus fishing income ($PPP) 30 days before, during, and after closures, at
villages both with and without closures. The data depicted are from 28 closure periods showing closure-implementing villages and their control villages
from 2004–2011. Data are separated by season, thus separating closures that occurred independently of a regional fishery shutdown (“no ban”), and
those that extended the shutdown (“ban”). As “during” periods are not exactly 30 days, “during” values are scaled to a per-30-day measure. Significance
indicators show distinctions between a particular group and its “before” group comparison, from linear mixed-effect model. NS = Not Significant;
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. For effort, value per unit effort, and data aggregated across seasons, please see S5 & S6 Figs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.g004
Table 1. Mean Village Level Octopus Income Before and After Temporary Closures.
Foregone Catch
$PPP During-
Before
Opening Boost
$PPP After-
Before
Effort Change
During-Before
Effort Change
After-Before
Income per
Effort During-
Before
Income per
Effort After-
Before
% Fished
Area Closed
ALL CLOSURES
Closure
Villages (36)
-$1 $817 -14.8% 102.5% $0.54 $1.36 18.6%
Control
Villages (28)
-$17 $214 -7.9% 95.4% $0.37 $0.66 0.0%
CLOSURES INDEPENDENT OF REGIONAL SHUTDOWN–“NO BAN”
Closure
Villages (17)
$104 $865 5.3% 100.3% $0.55 $1.48 16.6%
Control
Villages (14)
$49 $189 12.7% 58.5% $0.64 $1.02 0.0%
CLOSURES EXTENDING REGIONAL SHUTDOWN–“BAN”
Closure
Villages (19)
-$96 $775 -32.8% 104.5% $0.53 $1.25 20.4%
Control
Villages (14)
-$82 $240 -28.5% 132.3% $0.09 $0.30 0.0%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.t001
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closures (p = 0.25; Fig 4). However, for those “ban” closures that extended the regional fishery
shutdown, there was a weakly significant income increase in control villages comparing before
to after periods (+88%, p = 0.043; Fig 4).
3.3. Site-level net economic benefits, internal rate of return, and return
on investment
We present the un-discounted net earnings (NE), the monthly internal rate of return (IRR),
and the percentage return on investment (ROI) for each site (Figs 5 and S8). Each of these val-
ues represents the median value after 1,000 model runs for each of the 36 closures.
The majority (27 of 36; 75.0%) of the closures were strictly profitable, with positive NE,
monthly IRRs, and ROIs (Table 2; Fig 5). The 36 closures netted the 12 implementing villages a
mean of $305 per closure (Table 2). The majority of closures also showed rapid returns on in-
vestment. The monthly IRRs of the 36 closures range from negative (a loss) to 319%, with a
mean value of 58% (+/- 30% CI95; Table 2, Fig 5), suggesting that the closures would satisfy
someone expecting half of their investment returned in a month, i.e., someone having a month-
ly discount rate of 50%. The mean ROI of the 36 closures was 81% (+/- 42% CI95), implying
that, on average, one dollar’s worth of octopus left in the ocean grew to $1.81 by the end of
a closure.
NE and IRR declined as illegal catches increased (Figs 5 and S8). This NE decline showed
most tangibly in lowered post-opening landings (i.e., benefits) and less so in costs due to fore-
gone catch. Conversely, in those sites with little reported illegal catch, we see a consistent pat-
tern of positive earnings and rapid rates of return (Figs 5 and S8, Table 3).
3.4. Seasonality
We examined seasonal patterns in closure effects (Tables 1 and 2), CPUE, and larval settlement
(back-calculated from growth-curves). Closures show stronger positive effects on CPUE and
village incomes during the austral winter (i.e., in “no ban” closures) than in austral summer
(i.e., “ban” closures; Tables 1 and 2). Across the entire fishery dataset with closure sites re-
moved, CPUE also shows clear seasonal trends with maximal CPUE occurring in austral winter
(S9 Fig). Using lagged cross-correlations between Loess-fitted CPUE and larval settlement indi-
ces (maximal between 4.5–5.5 months), we show that correlations with the settlement trends
can account for about 26% of the variation in the seasonal CPUE trend (r = 0.51, r2 = 0.26;
S9 Fig).
Discussion
4.1. Results summary
Periodic closures in the Velondriake LMMA’s octopus fishery had positive impacts. Both octo-
pus landings and CPUE increased significantly above baseline levels upon re-opening of closed
areas (Fig 3). Villages implementing closures saw a doubling of octopus fishery income after re-
opening, and saw no significant decline of income during closures (Fig 4). This lack of income
decline during closures suggests that fishers displaced their effort from the roughly 20% of a vil-
lage’s fished area that was closed to the remaining open-access areas fished by their villages.
Closures also showed positive net economic benefits at the site level using a conservative cost
model that does not allow income from displaced effort to offset costs from foregone catch.
These benefits were dependent upon good enforcement, as higher rates of illegal catch from
the closure site eroded net earnings (Figs 5 and S8; Table 3).
Catch & Economic Benefits of Periodic Octopus Fishery Closures
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075 June 17, 2015 13 / 24
Both site and village level effects were absent in the open-access controls for the 17 “no-
ban” closures that occurred independently of other management measures. However, open-ac-
cess controls for the 19 “ban” closures, during which all sites in the region were shut-down for
the first six weeks of a closure’s 2–3 month duration, showed significant if comparatively small
effects in landings, CPUE, and village income. While these “ban” effects partially confound the
local closure impacts we were trying to measure, the fact that they also showed positive results
Fig 5. Net Economic Benefits of Closures. Site-specific Net Earnings (NE) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 36 local closures, 2004–2011, using
site-based cost model. Point coding represents rates of illegal fishing during the closures: Low (< = 5% of baseline ‘before’ catches, blue circles), Moderate
(< = 50% of baseline catches, green squares), and High (>50% of baseline catches, red diamonds). Data points represent median values across 1000
model runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.g005
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provides further evidence that short-term closure regimes targeting rapidly growing organisms
can generate fishery and economic benefits.
4.2. Net income benefits in local context: Are income boosts
meaningful?
As Velondriake’s periodic closure regime generated tangible benefits and little to no foregone
catches, the increased net earnings attributable to the closures provided non-trivial welfare
gains. Overall, each of the 36 closures resulted in a mean boost in benefits of $817 per imple-
menting village(s) (Table 1), more than doubling (+136%) the baseline income from the octo-
pus fishery over the focal 30 days. Translating these gains into the effect on a village’s daily life,
this boost over baseline implies a mean benefit per unit effort (fisher-day) of $2.36. This trans-
lates to an extra $2.36–4.72 per household per day fished in a context where the average house-
hold earns just $7.77 per day [S1 File]. For each day spent gleaning octopus in this post-
opening period this income boost alone would supply the household with an extra 1–2 days of
rice or 2.5–5 days of fish.
4.3. Local time preferences: Do returns accrue fast enough to satisfy
subsistence fishers?
For the income gains we report to be perceived as economically beneficial to local fishers, they
must have accrued at rates fast enough to satisfy local preferences. Twenty-seven of the 36 ex-
amined closures produced positive net earnings (NE), but for an action to be perceived as eco-
nomically “worth the effort”, high NE must be paired with internal rates of return (IRRs) high
enough to match local time preferences [68].
Table 2. Closure Site Net Economic Benefits.
Foregone Catch ($ PPP) Beneﬁt ($ PPP) NE ($ PPP) Monthly IRR (%) ROI (%)
All Closures (N = 36)
Total -$18,294 $29,270 $10,976
Mean -$508 $813 $305 57.7% 80.9%
95%CI $105 $193 $156 30.3% 42.0%
Closures Independent of Regional Shutdown (“No Ban” N = 17)
Total -$9,834 $15,684 $5,850
Mean -$578 $923 $344 84.7% 90.7%
95%CI $173 $297 $239 49.9% 51.3%
Closures Extending Regional Shutdown (“Ban” N = 19)
Total -$8,460 $13,586 $5,126
Mean -$445 $715 $270 33.5% 72.1%
95%CI $122 $251 $210 33.7% 66.1%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.t002
Table 3. Effect of Illegal Fishing on Mean Closure Site Net Economic Benefits.
Level of Illegal Fishing # NE IRR ROI
Low 18 $486 (+/- $211) 88% (+/- 37%) 123% (+/- 62%)
Moderate 9 $276 (+/- $373) 42% (+/- 80%) 66% (+/- 92%)
High 9 $-28 (+/- $116) 13% (+/- 41%) 11% (+/- 43%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129075.t003
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In economic terms, time preference is the relative value of immediate versus delayed re-
wards, and is expressed as the "discount rate" [68]. Individual time preferences are notoriously
difficult to measure and compare, in part because they are very sensitive to elicitation or obser-
vation method [69]. Estimates of Vezo discount rates span a wide range. In assessing develop-
ment projects, practitioners often apply a rate of 10–12% annually in the developing world
(0.8–0.95% monthly). A discrete choice experiment designed to assess long-term ecosystem
service values within Velondriake found fishers’ discount rates around 4.1% monthly [70], sub-
stantially lower than measures from other subsistence fishers who routinely show rates above
10% monthly [71]. An anthropological study targeting Vezo at the southern border of Velon-
driake found higher rates in which the modal response fell between 30% and 47% monthly
[72].
Using the standard development project rate (0.8–0.95% monthly) or that estimated from
within Velondriake (4.1% monthly) all closures with positive NE (27 of 36) generated returns
rapidly enough to satisfy Vezo fishers (Fig 5). Even when using the higher estimated range
(30–47% monthly), over 60% of closures with positive NE did not disappoint their sponsors:
17 of the 27 “profitable” closures had IRRs above 47% (and three more were close, at 27%,
28%, and 34%). This site-based model’s economic benefit outcomes are conservative, because
in practice, as we show in the village-level analysis, fishers were able to divert fishing effort to
unmanaged sites during closure periods and thereby catch octopuses that were not accounted
for in this site-focused theoretical model. What the economic results do suggest is that 75% of
closures met a strict “profitability” criterion and between 60–100% of those “profitable” clo-
sures produced net economic benefits rapidly enough to satisfy extremely high discount rates.
Understanding resource users’ discount rates, and how they affect behavior [73], can guide
managers’ choice of appropriate management tools, as local discount rates are intimately tied
to resource extraction and environmental stewardship [74,75]. In places where discount rates
are high, the time horizon of management’s pay-off is critical to community acceptance.
4.4. Local management relevance: enforcement & seasonality
In village meetings, communities spent considerable time discussing the details of proposed
closed sites, such as duration, size, enforceability, and timing (Key Informant Interview, Shawn
Peabody, co-manager). For the closures in this study, neither closure size nor duration had sig-
nificant effects on net economic benefits, but both effective enforcement and seasonal timing
did.
Without effective enforcement, there is no reliable post-closure benefit and the most eco-
nomically rewarding strategy reverts to open-access fishing. As the closure regime spread, un-
enforced, or broken, closures occurred from time to time (Key Informant Interview, Roger
Samba, community leader). Fishers reported catches within closed areas to the buyers and data
collectors because these agents had no enforcement or sanctioning duty, or in some cases vil-
lages chose not to enforce a planned closure. These reported illegal catches nonetheless likely
represent a minimum estimate of illegal catch. As effective enforcement had the clearest im-
pacts on a closure’s net earnings, strategies focusing on improving effective enforcement of the
closed area would likely return tangible results.
Seasonality may also be an important consideration. Other higher latitude octopus fisheries
show patterns of strong seasonality [76–78], but seasonal patterns in maturity appear compara-
tively more subtle in the Malagasy stocks [52]. Nonetheless, the village and site-level analyses
present evidence that closures showed larger effects during the austral winter season (Jun-Sep),
as opposed to those that extended the regional shutdown and opened in summer (Feb; Tables 1
and 2). This profitability pattern matches the seasonal fluctuation in CPUE across the entire
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fishery (with closure effects removed), which peaks in June-August (S9 Fig). These annual pat-
terns in CPUE and stronger closure effects might be explained by a broad peak in estimated O.
cyanea larval settlement that occurs in February-March, with a narrower peak in September.
Closures set in the austral winter (Jun-Aug) may protect the settlers from earlier in the year
(Jan-Mar), during a period of near-maximum growth rates [67]. Although explicit population
models of settlement and growth are beyond the scope of this paper, this remains an enticing,
if underexplored hypothesis.
4.5. Transferability of the approach
In any setting, the optimal periodic closure regime must be designed around the specific bio-
economics and governance context. Further examining this case can provide insight into the
transferability of the approach and results, as well as lessons, for other locations. This case is an
example of a successful periodic harvest regime that focused on a particularly appropriate sin-
gle species (Octopus) and fishery (low selectivity, low harvesting cost, traditional gear), in a
context that had some, but not all, of the factors thought to facilitate success
[13,16,23,24,29,46,52].
First, biologically, octopus may have been an ideal species to manage. Models show that
rapid growth and short lifespans allow for shorter optimal closure times [31,32,43], and O. cya-
nea grows rapidly and non-asymptotically, completing its lifecycle within a year [55,67,78].
Second, the nature of the fishery may have been a critical factor in the success of the periodic
closures. Poor selectivity of size classes in a fishery and high intensity harvesting skew the opti-
mal harvest regime from stationary to periodic harvests [31,43]; the Velondriake octopus fish-
ery was not selective enough to avoid juvenile capture, both due to the style of fishing (blind
spearing into a den [79]) and because year-round spawning and settlement reduce seasonal,
age-homogeneous cohorts [52]. Low harvesting costs also can lead to high intensity harvesting;
gear for the Velondriake fishery was generally a spear and a bucket, and in rare cases a mask
[61], and everyone fished for octopus on a regular basis [61].
Third, the economics of the fishery were important. Again, bio-economic models suggest
that the value of the landings and discount rate are key considerations [43]. In Velondriake, the
product generated significant cash for the communities [61], and the wealth was distributed
relatively evenly across the community thanks to broad participation and minimal access re-
strictions [61,80,81]. Moreover, the reward for management was accrued rapidly, at a rate that
satisfied Vezo fishers’ discount rates.
Finally, experience suggests governance and social factors are critical to successfully con-
strain fishing patterns to the optimal schedule [22–24,29,45]. Velondriake had strong leader-
ship that people trusted and high levels of social capital [82]. Velondriake did not possess all
social factors typically cited as critical for success, however. According to our household survey
and previous surveys, local knowledge of the human impact on ecological systems was weak.
And, while some periodic closure studies suggest that exclusive tenure increases the likelihood
of success of periodic closures, our case was more in line with the body of empirical evidence
that common property institutions can successfully implement management without property
rights over the resource [17].
4.6. A Community management catalyst?
This case adds to a growing body of evidence of a pattern where experience with effective peri-
odic closures leads to broader management. Following the wide adoption of this closure re-
gime, the communities within the Velondriake area adopted a substantially broader range of
community-based and co-management actions. Such actions included: the formation of an
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LMMA represented by a governing body, the Velondriake Committee [49]; the extension of
the periodic closure regime into mangrove habitats [49]; the banning of destructive fishing
methods [58]; the formal gazetting of the Velondriake LMMA [48] and finally, the founding
and community enforcement of six no-take marine reserves [48]. This pattern mirrors experi-
ences with periodic closures in Vanuatu and Indonesia, where support for the limited closure
regimes facilitated community engagement in broader management [45,47].
This pattern also appears to be a plausible mechanism when examined in light of the litera-
ture on successful management of common pool resources [13,16,17,46]. A low cost and eco-
nomically effective periodic harvest regime passes a fundamental principle from common pool
resource theory: that the local fisher community perceives that expected management benefits
outweigh the costs of organizing [46]. Once in place, the activities associated with managing a
multi-village periodic closure regime may positively affect an important subset of criteria the
commons literature has found to be crucial for management self-organization: the potential for
local leadership to arise [13,46]; an increase in inter-village communication and building of so-
cial capital and trust [13,16,46]; improved knowledge of humans’ effects on the resource system
[16,46]; and the ability to craft and enforce collective choice rules [13,46]. By building better
conditions for cooperation [46], the management of an effective periodic closure regime may
lower the metaphorical activation energy for other, broader management, just as a catalyst
would in a chemical reaction. This potential is by no means a panacea for community manage-
ment ills [83], but suggests that targeted and effective management might help catalyze broader
community management efforts. Further study of this apparent pattern and the catalyst hy-
pothesis could reveal important lessons for achieving desired ecological, social, and governance
outcomes in small-scale fisheries contexts across the world.
Conclusions
Periodic, temporary fishery closures targeted at rapidly growing species can have positive eco-
nomic benefits for low income fishing communities and can be a promising option for the
coastal management portfolio in less developed nations. Analysis of one regime in southwest
Madagascar suggests that the returns are substantial, rapid, and recurring. The short history of
management in the region also suggests that short-term interventions that demonstrate tangi-
ble management benefits may aid in the development of broader community and co-manage-
ment efforts. Formal studies of this “community catalyst hypothesis” would greatly clarify the
potential utility of periodic closures as part of a broader community-based
management portfolio.
Supporting Information
S1 Fig. Seasonal Fishery Impacts. Site-level (a) octopus landings (kg) and (b) fishing effort
(fisher-days), 30 days before and after closure at closed sites and paired control sites. Data are
separated by season, thus separating those closures that occurred independently of a regional
fishery shutdown (“no ban”, 17/36), and those that extended the shutdown (“ban”, 19/36). Sig-
nificance indicators show distinctions between a particular group and its “before” group com-
parison, independent contrasts from linear mixed models. NS = Not Significant;  = p<0.05;
 = p< 0.001. Seasons indicate timing of closure reopening, Spring = February-May,
Fall = June-September.
(JPG)
S2 Fig. Aggregate Fishery Impacts. Site-level (a) octopus landings (kg), (b) fishing effort (fish-
er-days), and (c) catch-per-unit effort (kg/fisher-day), 30 days before and after closure at closed
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sites and paired control sites. Data are aggregated across season/fishery shutdown. Significance
indicators show distinctions between a particular group and its “before” group comparison, in-
dependent contrasts from linear mixed models. NS = Not Significant;  = p<0.05;  = p<0.01;
 = p< 0.001.
(JPG)
S3 Fig. Daily Landings. Site-level octopus landings (kg) 30 days before and after closure at
closed sites (upper, red) and paired control sites (lower, blue). Data are separated by season,
thus separating those closures that occurred independently of a regional fishery shutdown (“no
ban”, 17/36), and those that extended the shutdown (“ban”, 19/36). Raw daily totals are shown
as gray points, with an overall mean and 95% CI shown as a red/blue line ‘before’, and a LOESS
fit with 95%CI shown ‘after’. Note that due to timing the opening with the low spring tide, data
‘after’ are in phase with tidal cycles, while those ‘before’ are not.
(JPG)
S4 Fig. Daily CPUE. Site-level catch-per-unit-effort (kg/fisher-day) 30 days before and after
closure at closed sites (upper, red) and paired control sites (lower, blue). Data are separated by
season, thus separating those closures that occurred independently of a regional fishery shut-
down (“no ban”, 17/36), and those that extended the shutdown (“ban”, 19/36). Raw daily totals
are shown as gray points, with an overall mean and 95% CI shown as a red/blue line ‘before’,
and a LOESS fit with 95%CI shown ‘after’. Note that due to timing the opening with the low
spring tide, data ‘after’ are in phase with tidal cycles, while those ‘before’ are not.
(JPG)
S5 Fig. Village Income. Total village-level octopus fishing income ($PPP), and village-level oc-
topus fishing income per unit of fishing effort ($PPP/fisher-day) 30 days before, during, and
after closures, at villages both with and without closures. The data depicted are from 28 closure
periods showing closure-sponsoring villages and their paired control villages from 2004–2011.
Data are aggregated by season. As “during” periods are not exactly 30 days, “during” values are
scaled to a per-30-day measure. Significance indicators show distinctions between a particular
group and its “before” group comparison, from linear mixed-effect model. NS = Not Signifi-
cant;  = p< 0.05;  = p< 0.01;  = p< 0.001.
(JPG)
S6 Fig. Village Effort, VPUE. Total village-level octopus fishing effort (fisher-days) and vil-
lage-level octopus fishing income per unit effort ($PPP/fisher-day) 30 days before, during, and
after closures, at villages both with and without closures. The data depicted are from 28 closure
periods showing closure-sponsoring villages and their paired control villages from 2004–2011.
Data are separated by season, thus separating those closures that extended a regional fishery
shutdown, and those that occurred independently of the shutdown. As “during” periods are
not exactly 30 days, “during” values are scaled to a per-30-day measure. Significance indicators
show distinctions between a particular group and its “before” group comparison, from linear
mixed-effect model. NS = Not Significant;  = p< 0.05;  = p< 0.01;  = p< 0.001.
(JPG)
S7 Fig. Site-base model example.Here we plot an example of a single site in our site-based
cost model, showing a timeline of the closure, with closure period (blue hatching), presence of
fishing in nearby villages (x’s along bottom), actual recorded landings (i.e. closure ‘benefits’,
black circles/bars), modeled foregone landings (i.e. closure ‘costs’, red circles/bars), and run-
ning sums (gray bars). Below we see the three distributions from which the counter-factual
landings are simulated: the pattern of visitation at this site across the whole dataset (excluding
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data from closure and post-closure periods), and value-per-unit effort distributions both dur-
ing and 60-days after the closure (again, excluding data from closure and post-closure periods).
(JPG)
S8 Fig. Illegal Fishing Rate vs. NE & IRR.Here we compare a site’s modeled Net Earnings
and monthly IRR to Illegal Catch Rates expressed as reported landings from a closed site dur-
ing the closure as a percentage of baseline landings during the 60 days before closure. Compari-
sons among both NE & IRR, and Illegal catch rate are shown both as continuous regressions,
and across catch rate categories.
(JPG)
S9 Fig. Seasonality in Settlement and Catch-Per-Unit-Effort (CPUE).Here we plot frequen-
cy of octopus settlement (as back-calculated from individual mass at capture and a species-
level growth curve) with Julian day, including data from 2004–2011 (blue bars). Overlaid on
these data is a LOESS fit of seasonal CPUE variation with 95%CI (red lines), with closure sites
removed. In green we show the timing of the annual regional fishery shutdown, which began
in 2006. Note the increase in CPUE variability during this more data-poor time. Below we plot
the cross-correlation of these trends, showing a maximal correlation at 159 days.
(PNG)
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